This paper (available here) has been a journey—rejected two times since the first draft and two years in the making, it has grown into something different than we initially planned with Krzysiek, when I sent him the Chalmers’ meta-problem paper and he asked if we want to write a comment together, but it turned out much more exciting!

In the current version we begin by pointing out that the meta-problem approach laid out by Chalmers is significantly flawed, as any solution it may arrive at depends on the assumptions about what intuitions are. Then we advance a novel and alternative program of investigating folk views on phenomenal consciousness, centering their positive intuitions. Instead of asking what consciousness is not, as Chalmers proposes—which could at best verify some of the extant approaches—we propose to ask what consciousness is (or how consciousness is). In this way, we believe, experimental philosophy could help generating new alternatives to entrenched views in consciousness debates.